

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1160

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 22, 1974
(SALT TWO-373)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AT
THE SALT TWO MEETING OF FEBRUARY 22, 1974.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

FEBRUARY 22, 1974

MR MINISTER:

I

AT OUR MEETING ON FEBRUARY 19, I OUTLINED BRIEFLY SEVERAL
CONCEPTS WHICH IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ARE BASIC TO
THESE NEGOTIATIONS. TODAY I WANT TO EXPLORE ONE OF THESE CONCEPTS
IN GREATER DEPTH.

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OUR NEGOTIATING TASK HAS BEEN DEFINED FOR US BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN THEIR AGREEMENT ON JUNE 21, 1973 CONCERNING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN ADDRESSING THIS TASK THE FIRST QUESTION THAT LOGICALLY ARISES IS: WHAT ARE THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THAT ARE TO BE LIMITED? IN SEEKING AN ANSWER, WE NATURALLY LOOK AT AGREEMENTS ALREADY REACHED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE ABM TREATY LIMITS ONE TYPE OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEM--THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITS LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, INCLUDING HEAVY ICBMS DEPLOYED AFTER 1964, AS WELL AS SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES.

BY SINGLING OUT LAND-BASED AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, THE DEFENSES AGAINST WHICH WERE LIMITED BY THE ABM TREATY, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS CONFIRMED THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF THESE TWO TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. BY LIMITING ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZED THE FORMIDABLE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITIES OF THESE ARMS. IN THEIR CAPABILITIES, THEIR ABILITY TO PENETRATE, AND PARTICULARLY IN THEIR POTENTIAL TO ATTACK THE RETALIATORY FORCES OF THE OTHER SIDE, THEY DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE ALSO IN ACCORD THAT ANOTHER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARM SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION, NAMELY, HEAVY BOMBERS. THESE CONSTITUTE A DIFFERENT CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AIR DEFENSES WHICH THEY MUST PENETRATE ARE NOT LIMITED BY ANY AGREEMENT. YET THE CAPABILITY OF HEAVY BOMBERS TO CARRY LARGE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OVER INTERCONTINENTAL RANGES MAKES THEM APPROPRIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A NUMERICAL AGGREGATE ALONG WITH ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS.

ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS ARE THE SYSTEMS IN WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE CONCENTRATED THEIR STRATEGIC POWER. THUS THEY PROVIDE THE PRIMARY IMPETUS FOR CONDUCTING THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

TO BE SURE, THERE ARE OTHER OFFENSIVE ARMS. EITHER ONE OR
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BOTH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS POSSESS, FOR EXAMPLE, BALLISTIC MISSILES OF MEDIUM OR INTERMEDIATE RANGE, MEDIUM AND LIGHT BOMBERS, FIGHTER BOMBERS, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. NONE OF THESE ARMS, HOWEVER, APPROACHES IN SIGNIFICANCE ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. ACCORDINGLY, THESE OTHER OFFENSIVE ARMS FALL INTO SEPARATE CATEGORIES WITH LESSER ORDERS OF IMPORTANCE.

THE UNITED STATES THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT THE FOCUS OF OUR

EFFORTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD BE ON ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THESE ARE THE SYSTEMS WHERE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL IS CONCENTRATED. THESE ARE THE SYSTEMS UPON WHICH THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE DEPENDS. THESE ARE THE SYSTEMS WHOSE LIMITATION IS IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN REDUCING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE HAVE REFERRED TO ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS AS "CENTRAL SYSTEMS" FOR THEY ARE INDEED CENTRAL TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND CENTRAL TO OUR TASK IN SEEKING LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

III

I TURN NOW, MR. MINISTER, TO A SECOND QUESTION. GIVEN THE PREMISE THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO LIMIT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, AT WHAT LEVEL SHOULD THIS TOTAL NUMBER BE SET?

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE APPROACHED FIRST IN A CONCEPTUAL MANNER. IF OUR TWO DELEGATIONS CAN REACH ACCORD ON A CONCEPT, THEN WE WILL BE ABLE TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC FIGURE.

DURING OUR RECENT RECESS, THE UNITED STATES CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF THE LEVEL OF LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. WE TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE NUMBERS EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY SPECIFIED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE REASONS THAT GAVE RISE TO THOSE NUMBERS. WE ALSO CAREFULLY STUDIED THE FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE INTERIM

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AGREEMENT AND TO ENDURE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

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SINCE THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS NOT TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS, IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR BOTH SIDES TO FORESEE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE THE LIKELY SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THAT SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THE REASONS THAT JUSTIFIED THE UNEQUAL LEVELS PROVIDED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE FORESEEN AS TRANSITORY. THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO LOSE THEIR JUSTIFICATION IN THE WAKE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. ACCORDINGLY THEY WOULD CEASE TO BE APPLICABLE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

IT STANDS TO REASON THAT, AS QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES IN THE

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES DECREASE, QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCES ACQUIRE A NEW SIGNIFICANCE. A CHANGE ON ONE SIDE OF THE STRATEGIC EQUATION WITHOUT AN OFFSETTING CHANGE ON THE OTHER SIDE CAN UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND CREATE AN UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. NEITHER SIDE CAN BE EXPECTED TO TOLERATE SUCH AN UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP.

OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL RECOGNIZED THIS
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FACT. THEY AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE GUIDED BY THE RECOGNITION THAT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THEY FURTHER AGREED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE TWO SIDES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY HAS ALREADY SERVED US WELL IN THE FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATIONS. IT IS THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLE THAT MADE POSSIBLE THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ABM TREATY.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE SAME PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY SHOULD GUIDE OUR DELIBERATIONS IN THE PREPARATION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THUS, WHEN WE ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF AT WHAT LEVEL OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD LIMIT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, OUR REPLY IS: AT A LEVEL EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES. IN AGREEING ON AN EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBER FOR THE THREE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WHERE THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF EACH SIDE IS CONCENTRATED, WE WOULD BE RIGOROUSLY OBSERVING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERLIE OUR NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY, RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND RECOGNITION OF THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR EITHER SIDE.

SINCE WE RECOGNIZE THAT DIFFERENCES EXIST IN THE WAY EACH GOVERNMENT HAS DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE LEVELS AND CAPABILITIES OF EACH OF THE SYSTEMS--ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS--BE IDENTICAL, PROVIDED THAT THE TOTAL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ALL THESE SYSTEMS PERMITTED TO THE TWO SIDES IS EQUAL.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NEEDS TO PROVIDE A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES. AN EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD BE A PRIMARY ELEMENT IN ESTABLISHING THIS EQUIVALENCE.

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THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE INITIAL AGGREGATE LEVEL SHOULD BE ONE TO WHICH EACH SIDE CAN ADJUST WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN ITS CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS. THE UNITED STATES THEREFORE SUPPORTS AN INITIAL AGGREGATE CEILING OF 2350.

FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THAT EQUALITY CAN BE PRESERVED AND STABILITY ENHANCED AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN THAT OF THE INITIALLY AGREED AGGREGATE. THUS, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, PHASED OVER AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, CONSISTENT WITH EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LIMITS.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT AN EQUAL LIMIT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS ON EACH SIDE TO BE AN INDISPENSABLE PART OF ANY PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IT WOULD

BE CONSISTENT IN FACT AND IN THE PERCEPTIONS OF BOTH SIDES WITH
ESSENTIALLY EQUAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITY. GIVEN SUCH AN EQUITABLE
APPROACH TO A LIMIT ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF THE CENTRAL
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, WE BELIEVE OUR EFFORTS TO REPLACE THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WILL BE GREATLY
FACILITATED.

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